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(iii)

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FLOYD WEBSTER,

.]

Plaintiff-Respondent, ]
Appeal No. 19339
vs.
MARY LEHMER AND CHARLES LEHMER, ]
Defendant-Appellants. ]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Respondent Floyd Webster seeks rescission of a
contract for the sale of his home and lot in Deer Valley and
Defendants/Appellants Mary and Charles Lehmer, in a counterclaim,
pray for specific performance of the contract.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT
Webster commenced this action in the District Court for Summit
County, Utah, on July 14, 1981, seeking rescission of the sale of
his home and lot in Deer Valley.

Lehmers answered the complaint

and counterclaimed, seeking specific performance of the agreement.
At the conclusion of the trial to the court, conducted on
January 18th through 20, 1983, the court announced its ruling in
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favor of Webster.

(T. 414-419).~/

The district court entered

judgment (R. 367-369) and the ultimate findings of fact and
conclusions of law were filed on June 29, 1983.

(R. 493). The

district court's judgment granted Websterfs requested relief of
rescission of the real estate agreement.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Lehmers seek reversal of the district court's order of
rescission of the real estate contract and for an order of specific
performance in favor of Lehmers or, alternatively, a new trial.
Webster asks that the judgment be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Since this is a case in equity it is the sum of the
circumstances that is important.

Appellants in their opening

brief use fourteen pages to cover their statement of facts.
Because it is the sum that is important, plaintiff will first point
out the statements of the defendants that appear to be inaccurate
or misleading and second set forth plaintiff's own statement of
facts so that the entire matter can be seen in proper perspective.
1.

Facts or Implications Set Forth In Appellant's Brief
To Be Controverted In Whole or In Part.

References are to the Trial Transcript ("T"), the designated
record from the District Court file ("R").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Paragraph 5 of the opening brief makes the statement that,
"In 1948 and continuing thereafter, the underlying fee simple
interest and ownership of the subject property were held in
independent ownership."

We would acknowledge that record title to

the underlying fee simple interest was in the mining company and
its successors in interest but allege that there was a genuine
issue as to right of possession and therefore ownership.

Defendants

acknowledged the distinction and recognized that Webster was the
de facto owner of the property.

(T. 309:4-14).

On pages 6 and 15

of plaintiff's opening brief, they speak of the "sophisticated"
mining machinery and allege "In conjunction with this mechanical
work, Webster used and understood technical manuals and printed
materials concerning the machinery and vehicles on which he worked"
and that "he readily understood complex mechanical manuals and he
read the daily newspaper."

These conclusions from the testimony

are clearly non-sequitur or at least gross distortions calculated
to mislead and are contrary to what was conspicuous to the trial
judge.

See Finding #5 and Conclusion #1.

The statement on page 6

that "Webster had never relied upon the Lehmers for business advice
or the conduct of his day-to-day affairs and Webster was capable of
making his own independent decisions" is not completely accurate
and conflicts with the evidence.

See plaintiff!s statement of facts

and supporting references that follow.

The statement at the bottom

of page 7 that the contract "was read and understood by Webster and
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the Lehmers" is too absolute as will be hereinafter pointed out.
On page 8 of the opening brief, there is the allegation that "In
late October 19 80, Webster decided to move from the subject property
and live with his former neighbor, Mary Dudley, in Heber City, Utah.
Webster advised Lehmers of that intention and by the end of November
1980 Webster had voluntarily removed himself from the subject
property."

This statement must be modified by the fact that Mr.

Webster continued to sleep in the home from time to time during
October, November and December.

(T. 182-183).

Again on page 10

there is a need to draw a distinction between title being in the
name of and owned by Royal Street Land Company vis-a-vis the
"record title" being reflected in said name.

Page 11 of their brief

claims, "The policy (50* a square foot) was not only undeclared and
unpublished, it was not generally disseminated in the Park City
area.

The testimony is absolutely clear that Lehmers were not

aware of any informal or ad hoc policy of Royal Street between
October and December 1980."

Both defendant Mary Lehmer and her

witness Neil Clegg stated the contrary.

See Neil Clegg1s testimony

(T. 334-335) and Lehmer's testimony (T. 269). On page 11 it is
alleged that "On the other hand, Webster had been told by a
neighbor, Neil Clegg, prior to October 1980, that Royal Street
might have an informal policy in which the underlying fee title
could be acquired and that Webster should check with Royal Street

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to determine whether that policy would apply to his squatter's
interests."
Mr. Webster.

The existence of said "conversation" is denied by
(T. 146-147).

Appellants statement of facts and

conclusions and references on pages 12 and 13 of their opening brief
need to be scrutinized.

For example, the question to Mr. Webster

was,
Q.

Now, with regard to whether the ground surrounding
your property was owned by the BLM or by Royal Street,
it didn't make any difference to you, did it, at the
time you sold the property to Mrs. Lehmer?

A.

No, it didn't.

(T. 147-148)

Mr. Campbell, thinking one thing but saying something else, asked
concerning the property "surrounding" the Floyd Webster parcel.
He did not inquire as to whether it made any difference as to who
was the "record title" holder of the property upon which Mr.
Webster's home was located, that is, the property that was subject
to Floyd Webster's easement, his adverse possession claim, his
squatter's interest.
surrounding property.

Of course it made no difference who owned the
But what about the subject property?

the important question.

That's

Further, what was Mr. Webster's

understanding of the term "underlying property?"

Did this term

connote, to the old miner, the mineral or subsurface rights?

The

word "underlying" by dictionary definition means "lying beneath."
Surface vis-a-vis subsurface or mineral interests; record title
holder vis-a-vis de facto owner or adverse possession owner; Floyd
Webster's home and lot vis-a-vis the surrounding property; what are
we talking about, what was contemplated by the witness?
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How much

did Mr. Webster comprehend?

How much distortion resulted from the

suggestive form of the question?

In fairness to the witness there

needed to be a distinction drawn between record title and the right
to possession, that is, ownership rights established by way of
easement and/or adverse possession.

Floyd Webster did make it clear

that he would not have sold if he had known he was on mining company
property.

(T. 133, 175). The record is replete with examples of

this witness giving simple but completely accurate responses to a
question, which answers, on first impression, appeared to counsel
to be either inaccurate or inconsistent.

Page 14 alleges that Floyd

Webster "was not under any disability" but that "Webster claimed at
trial that he was a drunk, an alcoholic, and that he was depressed
because of the death of his wife."

It was primarily his friends

and associates that were aware of this condition, not Mr. Webster
(T. 205-206, 208), although he himself recognized that he was
destitute and depressed.

(T. 194-195).

The allegation that

"Lehmers were not aware of any claimed alcoholic problem of Webster"
is contrary to the circumstantial evidence and there is an
interesting, if not amusing acknowledgement, by Mary Lehmer
to the reality of this "problem."

On page 251 of the transcript

Mrs. Lehmer was asked "You knew on October 7, 19 80, that Floyd
Webster had a drinking problem; did you not?"

Answer.

"No.

"I've known of no drinking problem he has. He just likes to drink."
The statement on page 14 that, "There is no testimony that in
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October 19 80 Webster was incapable of handling or administering
his affairs," is in dispute.
capability.

The real issue was the extent of his

In our statement of facts we reflect those matters

that shed light on the matter.
transcript reads:

A statement on page 16 of the

"At the date of the transaction, the Lehmers

believed that the fair market value of Webster's squatter1s rights
was not more than $5000.00."

Our riposte:

Mary Lehmer was an

astute attorney, a sizeable landholder in Park Cityf she served on
the committee that formulated Summit County's zoning ordinance and
on the Park City Master Plan Committee/ she was city attorney from
1968-70 and a council member from 1972-76/ she was well aware of the
50C a square foot policy and knowledgeable concerning possessory
rights of the squatters, including Floyd Webster's, which squatters
she had competently advised about their right to permanently remain
on the land, and she had just three months before negotiated for and
acquired record title to her 26,000 square feet of property in Deer
Valley for ?2,000.00 from Royal Street Land Company and she knew
that Floyd Webster and many of her neighbors with houses on Royal
Street Land Company land - mining company land - were in a similar
position to so purchase.

(T. 39-46/ 309:4-14).

Circumstantial

evidence was so clear and convincing to the contrary that in substance
the trial court found her purported statement of belief to
have been impeached.

On page 16 we find the following statement:
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"The only testimony offered at trial as to the fair market value
of the squatter's rights sold by Webster to Lehmers on October 7,
1980, as amended on December 20, 1980, was that of Lehmers, viz,,
between $1500.00 to $5000.00."

These statements are controverted

as now hereinafter set out.
2.

Plaintiff's Statement Of The Facts.

While in a state of extreme poverty and somewhat depressed,
without heat or water in his small home (T. 106; 115:11-116:23;
194:18-195:13; 205:23-206; 208:18-24 Exhibit 17), Floyd Webster,
a 61 year old unemployed miner with 25 years underground (T. 103:10-18)
and an eighth grade education (T. 94:16-21), is called in off the
street on October 7, 1980, while passing the home of his neighbors
and friends, Ray and Mary Lehmer.
257:25-258:21).

(T. 101:10-102; 115:4-10; 167;

They lived next door to each other in Deer Valley.

Mary Lehmer, successor to a "squatter," an attorney, former Park
City Attorney and member of the City Council (T. 222:2-5; 405:9-10)
acquired the record title to 26,000 square feet of property in Deer
Valley just three months before for $2,000.00 from Royal Street
Land Company (T. 41-45) and she knew that Floyd Webster and many
of her neighbors with houses on Royal Street Land Company land—
mining company land—had a "title problem" about which she had been
active in counseling them.

The problem results from living in a

house on mining company land, a situation which she had in common
with Floyd Webster and other neighbors and had extensively
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researched.

(T. 236-250).

She and her husband had previously

discussed Floyd Webster and his property and called him in from
the porch as he passed by on the street, all part of a
preconceived plan (T. 101, 102, 115, 257, 258) to acquire
$240,000.00-$400,000.00 worth of property from a friend and
neighbor for a sum slightly in excess of $5,000.00.
Mary Lehmer had counseled Floyd Webster as an attorney after
his wife's, Alice's, death in 1975 and had also advised Alice.
(T. 108:19-109 134:1-7; 223:5-6; 236:18-21; 245:21-246:17; 281:11-14).
Floyd Webster had met with her and her husband many times and done
work for them without charge.

(T. 106:20 to 108:5; 110 to 112).

Floyd Webster "trusted" Mrs. Lehmer and her husband and "figured
that she was a square-shooter" "her being an attorney."
(T. 123:3-20; 193:7-10).

During October and December of 1980

Floyd Webster had a drinking problem (T. 106:13-19; 134:15-20;
206-208) undoubtedly known to the Lehmers (T. 251:34) and they also
knew he needed money.

It was at a time when nothing seemed to "make

any difference" (T. 147:20 to 150). But still it appears that he
"would not have sold (his home and land) for $5,000.00" if he "had
known that (his home) was on mining property."

(T. 133, 169:8-9).

When he came into the house Mary and Ray Lehmer immediately
offered Floyd Webster $5,000.00 for his house and interest in the
property except for the right to live there for life and she promptly
drew up an agreement in her handwriting which he and the Lehmers
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signed.

(T. 167 and Exhibit 11).

Floyd Webster believed he had

certain vested rights in the surface (T. 166:17-23, 178) possibly
because of the advice that attorney Mary Lehmer had given to him.
(T. 246:4-9).

Floyd knew when he signed this agreement that Royal

Street had a policy of selling title for 50£ a foot to persons who
had their homes on mining company land (T. 120:9-25; 163, 48:9-10,
60:19-2 0) and he also knew that property smaller than his had been
sold for much more than $5,000.00.

In fact, a smaller parcel than

his sold for $190,000.00 between November 1980 and January of
1981.

(T. 6-10, Exhibits 1-4). It was Floyd Webster's belief when

he signed this agreement that the land under the subject house was
owned by the Bureau of Land Management and not the mining company
(T. 117-120; 149; 169; 217) and he thought that Ray and Mary Lehmer
believed this too because he knew they were knowledgeable about the
property situation in Deer Valley and he trusted that they would
tell him if they knew otherwise.

(T. 123). He recognized an

economic difference created in part because of the 50<? policy.
(T. 175:21-25).

And he would not have sold had he been aware that

it was on mining property (property owned by Royal Street Land
Company).

(T. 133:14-21).

As the agreement of 10/7/80 didn't provide any time for the
payment to Floyd Webster and he needed money, he went back to the
Lehmer residence three times in October and November of 1980 to
obtain advances totaling $700.00.

(T. 125-126; 179-182).
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When he

went again to their residence on 12/21/80 to secure an advance
of $100.00 or $200.00 for Christmas, Mary Lehmer wrote up another
agreement in his presence and he signed it.

(T. 131:23 to 133; 224).

This agreement provided that he would surrender his life estate in
the property in exchange for payments by the Lehmers of (1) the
"unpaid water, sewer, and scavenger charges of $356.20 needed to
reinstall meter and connect water to my house," (2) "the 1980
taxes due and unpaid on my house," and (3) "the legal expenses
and recording fees to terminate my dead wife's joint tenancy in my
home."

(Exhibit 12).

Attorney Lehmer understood the significance

of joint tenancy property.

(T. 226:4-227:1; 230:16-22).

She was

knowledgeable concerning the laws of intestate succession and knew
that if the property was not in joint tenancy, that Floyd Webster's
two daughters were entitled to two-thirds of their mother's
one-half interest.

(T. 233-235).

It was the intention of Mary

Lehmer that this agreement written on the back of that of 10/7/80
would integrate and merge both agreements into the latter.
Attorney Lehmer did not read or explain the agreements to Floyd
Webster but left it up to him to read and comprehend.
to adequately do so.

(T. 130 to 131; 171:5-6).

He was unable

Three days later

on December 24, 19 80, the Lehmers rented the house for $250.00 a
month.

(T. 274:22-25).

Nyman did so.

They did not pay the 1980 taxes, Arlene

(Exhibit 5).

In January of 1981 Floyd Webster

refused to execute a deed to the Lehmers or take any more money
from them and on February 24th and 27th, 19 81, his attorney offered
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to return to the Lehmers the full amount of their advances and
expenditures.
3.

(Exhibits 23 and 24).

District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Floyd Webster, the plaintiff at the time of the transactions

involved, October 7, 1980, and December 21, 1980, was a sixty-one
year old miner of some thirty-three years of experience, twenty-five
of which were underground, with an eighth grade formal education.
Mary Lehmer, the remaining defendant, was a retired lawyer who
practiced many years with considerable experience in real estate
matters.
2.

The plaintiff and the defendant were neighbors for several

years and befriended one another.

The plaintiff trusted the

defendant and felt he could rely upon her advice which she gave
him and his wife without charge from time to time over the years.
The plaintiff placed confidence in the defendant to the extent that
he felt that the confidence would not be abused and that defendant
would not act contrary to his interest.
3.

That plaintiff after the death of his wife in 19 75 and

through the time of the transactions became despondent and depressed
to the extent that his personal affairs suffered; specifically, he
suffered from a severe drinking problem.

He lost his driving

privileges prior to and had no drivers license at the time of the
transactions involved here as a result of an arrest on a D.U.I,
charge.
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4.

His water and gas had been shut off in approximately

August of 1980.

In October of 1980 he was unemployed.

in need of money.
food and money.

He was

His family was assisting him by providing

His property taxes had not been paid for a period

of four years and were delinquent for three years.
5.

The plaintiff purchased the property in question, which

became the family residence for approximately thirty-three years,
with his wife as a tenant in common.

The plaintiff has an obvious

lack of mental capacity or training to independently understand
the effect of the transaction involved.

This was graphically

illustrated by his attempt to read the contract, Exhibit D-ll,
during the testimony.
6.

The defendant initiated the October 7, 1980, contact with

the proposal and immediately thereupon wrote the contract.
Plaintiff had no independent advice.
21, 1980.

The same occurred on December

The defendant had acquired the fee title to her own

land which consisted of approximately 35,355 square feet within
some six months or thereabouts prior to the transactions here in
question from Royal Street Land Development Company, the mining
company, for $2,000.00.

The land which is the subject of this

suit is a considerably smaller parcel.
7.

The defendant knew the plaintiff's home was not on Bureau

of Land Management (BLM) property as early as 1978 or 1979.
Indeed, the defendant knew, having researched the matter, that
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the so-called "squatters" had apparent adverse possessory rights
against the mining company as early as 1972.

The defendant knew

that the plaintiff was a "squatter" and that the mining company
had a policy of selling fee title to squatters for 50* a square
foot well prior to October 7, 1980.
8.

The plaintiff believed on October 7, 1980, and continued

to believe until February the 18th of 19 81 that his property was
owned by BLM; yet, significantly, no discussion regarding fee
ownership ensued during the contract negotiations.

There existed

grossly disparate sophistication regarding financial and real
estate matters to the extent that the transaction was not considered
by the court to be at arms length.
9.

Both parties believed the property was held in joint

tenancy when, in fact, it was held as tenants in common with an
interest in the plaintiff's daughters since his wife had died
intestate.

The property had a potential fair market value at the

time of the transactions to the plaintiff and his daughters of
$240,000.00 to $400,000.00, which was contracted away for the sum
of $5,000.00 plus the payment of miscellaneous items totaling
$409.20.
10.

The plaintiff would not have sold for that amount had he

known the property was not on BLM property.

The mining company

would have sold him fee title for 50C a square foot.

The court

cannot see that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence let alone
gross negligence in not being aware of fee ownership and so finds.
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The court cannot say either that this unawareness was the result
of inexcusable lack of due care and so finds,
11.

The transaction of December 21, 1980, involved a

possessory interest created by that of October 7, 1980.

Three

days later, on December 24, 1980, defendant rented the dwelling
on the subject property for $250.00 a month and it has been
continuously rented at or above that amount since that time.
There were no legal expenses in connection with the severance of
the non-existent joint tenancy.

Defendant intended the two

transactions to be integrated in one contract.
12.

Defendant will not be seriously prejudiced by rescission

except to lose the benefits of the unconscionable contract.

It

is possible to now restore defendant to the status quo - there
being no evidence that defendant changed her position after the
execution of the October 7, 19 80, and December 21, 19 80, writings.
13.

The proof that established the existence of the foregoing

facts was clear and convincing.
From the foregoing facts, the court concludes:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There existed grossly disparate sophistication regarding

financial and real estate matters to the extent that the transaction
was not considered by the court to be at arms length.
2.

The plaintiff was not guilty of negligence, let alone

gross negligence, in not being aware of fee ownership nor was this
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unawareness the result of inexcusable lack of due care.
3.

Defendant will not be seriously prejudiced by rescission

and it is possible to now restore her to the status quo.
4.

There existed a unilateral mistaKe of fact on the part of

the plaintiff regarding ownership of the property sufficient to
warrant rescission; indeed the consequences of which were so grave
that to enforce this contract would be unconscionable.

This

unilateral mistake of fact specifically related to a material
feature of the contract, that is the purchase pricef in accordance
with the doctrine set forth in the case of Ashworth v. Charlesworth,
119 UT 650 (1951), and the plaintiff under the circumstances did
not act negligently.
5.

There existed a confidential relationship which has been

adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Blodgett v.
Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d 298 (1978), between the parties founded
upon trust and friendship developed over a period of years, which
trust and confidence were abused sufficient to warrant rescission.
If a party in whom another reposes confidence misuses that
confidence to gain his own advantage while the other has been made
to feel that the party in question will not act against his welfare,
the transaction is the result of undue influence in accordance
with 13 Williston on Contracts, Section 1625.
6.

There existed a mutual mistake of fact sufficient under

the circumstances to warrant rescission.

The title was held in
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tenancy in common pursuant to Statute 57-1-5 of the Utah Code
Annotated.
tenancy.

Both parties believed the property was held in joint

As concerning the mutual mistake as to ownership of the

property, such, a unique set of circumstances were present that
the principle of mutuality of right should apply, that is, the
rights of the plaintiff and the defendants should be reciprocal.
7.

The two transactions are integrated, but if they were not

they should each be separately rescinded.
8.

The foregoing findings of fact and these conclusions of

law were established and are supported by clear and convincing
evidence.

4.

(R. 493-499).

Comment on Appellant's Reference To Matters
Not In Evidence. (See footnote 2, page 5 of
Appellant's Brief and various references to
depositions in Statement of Facts, etc.).

All depositions were published, but the court did not consider
the depositions in toto as having been offered and received as
evidence.

Portions did become part of the evidence as used at

time of trial during cross examination pursuant to Rule 32(a)(1)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The depositions were neither

formally offered nor admitted during the trial - they were not
received in toto pursuant to Rule 32(a)(2).

The court drew a

distinction between (a) a deposition being published and then used
for a specific purpose formally proposed by counsel during the
trial, and (b) a deposition being formally offered and admitted
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at trial to be considered in its entirety.

In the latter case,

opposing counsel is put on notice and has an opportunity to
respond and rebut.
and ruled upon.

This matter was presented to the trial court

(R. 373-374; 392; 489-490; 493). We believe

that the depositions in toto as well as other matters not received
in evidence strengthen and support plaintiffs position, but
consider it improper to insert the same within the brief inasmuch
as they are not part of the evidence offered and received.
Defendants effort to use non-evidentiary matters is improper.
ARGUMENT
Point I
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
WAS MATERIAL AND PROPERLY ADMITTED
The total consideration Lehmers paid for the property was
slightly in excess of $5,000.00.

The fair market value was

between $240,000.00 to $400,000.00.

It is self evident why

defendants adamantly resisted and still resist any evidence that
would reveal this gross desparity, for Lehmers had contracted to
pay only 1%% to 2%% of the fair market value.
Ultimate Issue In Condemnation Cases Vis-a-vis An Equity Case.
We are dealing with a case in equity.

"Equity considers factors

which may be irrelevant in actions at law, such as the unfairness
of a party's conduct. . . the hardship in granting or denying
relief.

Although an equity court no longer has complete
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discretion in granting or denying relief, it may exercise wide
judicial discretion in weighing the factors of fairness, . . , and
this court on appeal will reverse the trial court only where an
abuse, of this discretion is clearly shown."

Warren v. Dixen

Ranch Company, 123 Utah 416, 419.
The cases cited by defendant accurately set out the general
principles of law that apply in an ordinary condemnation case
where the ultimate issue of fact is "fair market value" or the
cash amount that must be paid for the property taken.

An eminent

domain proceedings is an action in law and not in equity.

The

ultimate issue is just compensation.
If, as the Warren case holds, "an equity court* . . may exercise
wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors. . ." and may
consider "factors which may be irrelevant in actions at law," then
the following facts should be considered and weighed and the
conclusions that are self evident should not be ignored.

Here

are the facts:
(a)

The property was appraised to have a value of

$240,000.00 by Pia.
(b)

(T. 69).

Brown, Lehmers' appraiser, acknowledged that

property was worth $300,000.00 to $400,000.-00.
(c)

(T. 380).

Floyd Webster and his wife had resided on and

possessed the property for more than 35 years having purchased
it from his wife's mother in 1948.

(T. 95, 102, Exhibit 10).
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(d)

Royal Street Land Company had a policy of selling

the property to squatters for 50C a square foot, which policy was
well known and was in existence on October 7, 1980, and on
December 21, 1980, and had been in effect for several years.
(T. 18, 22, 39, 40-43, 56).
(e)

Royal Street would have sold any interest or claim

it had in the property to Floyd Webster for the price of 50C a
square foot.

(T. 48, 60) .

(f)

Lehmers knew of the policy.

(T. 41-45; 269-287).

(g)

Lehmers believed and had advised others that it

was not even necessary to pay the 50£ a square foot.
(h)

(T. 309).

Lehmers purchased the property for approximately

$5,000.00 - about 2% of its fair market value.
If a court of equity can weigh the factors, it may also
consider the sum of the factors.

The disparity between the

$5,000.00 contract price and the $240,000.00 to $400,000.00 fair
market value is so clear that we might refer to this as a res ipsa
loquitur situation.
"Equity looks to the substance and not to the shadow, to the
spirit and not the letter. . . .

It seeks justice rather than

technicality, truth rather than evasion, common sense rather than
quibbling."

State v. Tyler County State Bank, 282 SW 211, 45 ALR

1483, 1484.

"Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.

It

is elastic in that it looks to the substance rather than the form,
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and will never be applied to reach an inequitable result, or
permit itself to be frozen into a position of applying mechanical
rules so that it becomes crystallized."

Cannon v. Bingham, 383

SW 2d 169, 174.
The lower court did not error by denying Lehmersr Motion
In Limine.

It had a right/ if not an absolute duty, to apply its

X-rays to all masks and covers and see through to the real substance
and to find the answer to the question, "What was the property
really worth?"
The inadequacy of consideration is not only relevant to the
issues of undue influence and mistake of fact, it constitutes a
ground for rescission of and by itself in an instance such as
the present one.

In discussing the various exceptions to the

general rule that the adequacy of the consideration is for the
parties rather than the courts, C.J.S. puts it this way:
"Where the inadequacy (of consideration) is so
gross as to shock the conscience and common sense
of all men, it may amount both at law and in equity
to proof of fraud, oppression, and undue influence.
Where the inadequacy is such as to shock the moral
sense, other circumstances such as fraud, mistake,
misapprehension, surprise, irregularity, or anything
else which conduces to the inadequacy of the price,
will be readily seized to void the agreement."
(Emphasis added) 17 C.J.S., Contracts 128, p. 846-7.
POINT II
RESCISSION BASED ON THE UNILATERAL
MISTAKE WAS JUSTIFIED
What is the testimony concerning the unilateral mistake?
Lehmer at first did not know whether the home and lot was situated
on BLM property
or "mining" property. She had this to say.
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A.

It's a quit claim deed which Mr. Webster told
me was the deed from his grantor to him and
his wife.

Q.

When did you first receive that?

A.

I was first showed it when he asked me into his
house after his wife's death to inquire into his
rights in this mining property. I looked at it
primarily to see that he had lived on the property
for more than 20 years.
(T. 223:2-8).

Q.

And with Bill and Mary Dudley?

A*

I knew their property was definitely on BLM land.

Q.

So they had a separate problem?

A.

Yes, and when I first talked with Floyd, I did
not know if his land was on Bureau of Land
Management lands or not.
(T. 241:14-21).

But later at the time of sale she had a definite belief.
Q.

(By Mr. Smedley) On October 7, 1980, you knew
that the Webster house was on mining company
property; did you not?

A.

I surely believed that, yes.
(T. 250:18-21).

Q.

Did you have an opinion as of October 7th, 1980,
as to whether or not Floyd Webster was a squatter?

A.

I have.

Q.

What was that opinion?

A.

That he was a squatter on mining property.
(T. 268:17-21).
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While Mrs. Lehmer's opinion gravitated towards the belief
that the Webster home was on "mining" property, Floyd Webster
arrived at the conclusion that he was on BLM land, and so believed
at the time of the sale.

He testified:

Q.

At the time you signed this document, who did you
believe owned the property upon which your house
is situated?

A.

Who owned the ground?

Q.

Yes. Who did you believe owned the ground?

A.

I believe the BLM did, the Bureau of Land
Management.

Q.

Why did you believe that?
(T. 117).

He then goes on to explain why he so believed.

(T. 117 to 120).

Counsel for the defendants tried to impeach and belittle the basis
for his belief by calling as their final witness a Stephen Schirf
and by attempting to prevent that cross examination which would
remove the mask and result in their gambit being played in vain.
Notwithstanding Schirf reluctantly acknowledged the very truth of
what he had been called upon to discredit.

(T. 401:10-13). His

testimony strengthened the integrity of plaintiff's position as
did each of defendant's previous witnesses, Brown, Clegg, and
Lehmer.
Ironically part of the parcel was in fact on BLM land.
(T. 235 and 405).
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Floyd Webster was aware of the 50C a square policy.
(T. 163) . He disclosed on the witness stand:
Q.

What difference does it make whether the land
is owned by BLM or whether it was owned by the
mining company or Royal Street?

A.

Well, the only difference I can see that BLM
ground, you can't buy that.
(T. 175).

Q.

(By Mr. Smedley) Mr. Webster, if on October 7th,
1980, you had known that your property was on
mining property or property owned by Royal Street
Land Company other than BLM property, would you
have sold it for $5,000?

A.

No.

Q.

Why not?

A.

I think that I could get more out of my property.
It was valued more.
(T. 133).

Q.

(By Mr. Smedley) With respect to the contract you
signed on October 7th, 1980, do you feel that Mary
was fair with you on that day?

A.

I figured she was, yes.

Q.

Do you feel that she is fair now?

A.

No.

Q.

Why not?

A.

Well, I figured that she knew that I was not on
BLM ground.

Q.

If you were not on BLM property, did you expect
Mary Lehmer to advise you that your land was not
on BLM property?

A.

I would expect her to, yes.
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Q.

Why?

A.

Well, I trusted her.

Q.

Why did you trust her?

A.

For being a friend, a neighbor, I figured I
trusted her.
(T. 123) .

Page 111 of the transcript may give some insight as to why
he might have felt that his trust was plausible.
Defendants rely heavily upon the precise wording from part
of a sentence out of a Florida Case cited in Ashworth v.
Charlesworth, 231 P.2d 724 (Utah 1951) and then sarcastically
castigate the old gentleman for the things "he blithely assumed"
and the things he failed for "more than 33 years" to do.
response is simple.

Our

Although the "ordinary diligence" doctrine

states a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence this
principle is not, in its application, so much an absolute rule to
be followed by the courts as it is a guide for determining whether
under the circumstances relief should be granted, for there is also
an established maxim that equity will not suffer a wrong to be
without a remedy, and this is probably the most important of the
principles which are addressed to the court.

But even this

"most important" principle is not absolute and thus we must
address the Ashworth v. Charlesworth argument*
We believe that the "ordinary diligence" test can be honored
by simply being sensitive to the circumstances.

Perhaps the
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language in Maryland Casualty Company v. Kransnek, 174 So 2d 541
more accurately sets our the fundamental principle that was
applied in the Ashworth case.

The Florida court declared:

"Equitable relief on the basis of unilateral
mistake going to the substance of the agreement
will be granted where the mistake did not result
from an inexcusable lack of due care under the
circumstances and the plaintiff's position has
not been so changed in reliance on the contract
that it would be unconscionable to order rescission."
Assuming the above, then first of all there must be lack of
due care and second this lack of due care must be inexcusable
under the circumstances.
Was Mr. Webster's failure to check out the ownership
(BLM v. mining) "inexcusable lack of due care under the circumstances?"
What were the circumstances?

A 61 year old miner with an

eighth grade education was called in off the street on the spur of
the moment by his friends and neighbors; his friends and neighbors
had him in their home court; he was there by invitation; they knew
the purpose of the invitation, he did not; the friends and
neighbors were people he trusted, one was an attorney that he had
done things for "just. . . as a favor, as a friend;1' he was indigent
and had a drinking problem; the water to his home had been turned
off, so had the gas; he was unemployed; his hosts had discussed
off and on their plan for acquiring his property; he had not given
any thought to selling his home; for him there was the
unavailability of independent advice; they had the benefit of
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legal training and some 39 years of law practice, of advocacy
and of training in the art of persuasion; they had bought and
sold a number of homes, all arms length transactions; in all his
life he had only purchased one home for the sum of $600,00 from
his wife's parents.

(Plaintiff's Statement of the Facts gives

transcript page for each of the above facts).
He did not ask them to purchase.
about selling.

He had not even thought

Yet he is criticized for not anticipating and

not having been prepared for the above unexpected execution of the
"plan."

Defendants seem to feel that the old minor should have

been aware that every man is to fare in this world according to
his management and everyone prospered according to his genius,
his knowledge, his plans and schemes and training.
It was the mosaic effect, the sum of the circumstances,
including the gross disparity between the potential fair market
value and the price contracted that caused the court to concludei
"There existed a unilateral mistake of fact
on the part of the plaintiff regarding ownership
of the property sufficient to warrant rescission;
indeed the consequences of which were so grave
that to enforce this contract would be
unconscionable. This unilateral mistake of fact
specifically related to a material feature of
the contract, that is the purchase price, in
accordance with the doctrine set forth in the case
of Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 UT 650 (1951) ,
and the plaintiff under the circumstances did not
act negligently." (R. 498).
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The foregoing circumstances should be compared with the
comments of Justice Latimer in the Ashworth v. Charlesworth case.
The Supreme Court, Latimer, J., held that the evidence sustained
the trial court's findings that the defendants bid had not been
based upon a mistake, at least a mistake that would justify a
rescission.

The defendants were subcontractors doing business as

painting contractors.

They bid and tneir bid was accepted.

In

affirming the trial judge Justice Latimer's opinion contained the
following observations concerning the circumstances:
Plaintiffs invited. . . the defendant partnership,
to submit bids on the painting of the bridge. The
invitation to defendants was extended in September,
1947. . . . At that time, Larsen told Charlesworth
that plaintiffs had a contract to construct and
paint the bridge at Green River and asked if
defendants would be interested in submitting a bid.
A few weeks later Charlesworth was in plaintiff's
office in Salt Lake City and Larsen had the
blueprints of the bridge on his desk. He told
Charlesworth that they were the plans for the bridge
which the parties had previously discussed.
According to Larsenfs testimony Jack Charlesworth
then examined the plans. . . . Toward the latter part
of September, 1947, Larsen called Jack Charlesworth
in Ogden and asked what his price would be for the
painting of the bridge. Charlesworth said he would
call Larsen back and give him a price. Charlesworth
then discussed the matter with his father, called
Larsen, and, over the telephone, gave a price of
$500 for the work. On October 3, 1947, Jack
Charlesworth caused a letter to be sent to plaintiffs
in which he submitted a bid for the painting of the
bridge. . .for the sum total of ?500. . . . After
receipt of defendants1 telephonic bid, plaintiffs
prepared a contract which was signed by Jack
Charlesworth on October 15, 1947. . . . The
• defendants were painting contractors of considerable
experience; they knew that plans and specifications
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had been prepared for the particular job; they
were able to read and interpret such plans; and
no reasonable excuse appears to justify their
failure to see and know what was clearly exhibited
by the drawings and specifications. In the early
part of the preliminary negotiations detailed plans
were submitted to them and the trial court found
that Jack Charlesworth saw and had an opportunity
to make a careful examination of them. . . . After
making an inspection of the plans and specifications/
defendants were not rushed into submitting a bid.
On the contrary, they were given ample time in which
to carefully consider their contract price and to
make any further inquiry or investigation desired
by them. Several days expired between the time Jack
Charlesworth looked over the plans and the time he
was contacted over the telephone. Thereafter, the
amount of the bid was discussed between the two
defendants before they submitted their written offer
to the plaintiffs. This offer was followed by the
preparation of a formal written contract, which was
submitted to the defendants for consideration. . . .
But, in view of all the facts and circumstances/ we
cannot hold that the trial judge abused his discretion
in denying defendants relief because of the claimed
failure to disclose. Plaintiffs believed they were
dealing with contractors who were competent to
estimate painting costs. They had not previously
contracted for the painting of bridges and were
unfamiliar with the manner or method of estimating
the costs of that type of work. Plaintiffs knew
that defendants had ample opportunity to examine the
plans and specifications. (119 Utah 653/ 657/ 658,
659/ 660) .
Citing Ashworth v. Charlesworth as "the controlling case law"
appellants quote only a portion of only one sentence to support
their position.

They interestingly leave out the qualifying words

and it is also interesting that their quote comes not from the
language of Justice Latimer but is selected from a portion of a
single sentence of a cited Florida case.

Justice Latimer
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emphasized portions of said authorities.

The portions he

emphasized includes such qualifying phrases as "generally" and
"where there is no. . . inequitable conduct."

Ashworth v.

Charlesworth, 119 UT 650, 656 and 657. A complete reading of
the Ashworth case would convince even the casual reader that the
case could be used to support the trial judge in his decision in
favor of Webster and against the defendants Lehraers.
Should not a court of equity consider how the old miner was
suddenly drawn into the act and how he was not advised by Attorney
Lehmer to consult with a disinterested friend or counsel?

We find

the following language in Am Jur:
In general, it may be said that wherever
advantage is taken of a party under
circumstances which mislead, confuse, or
disturb the just result of his judgment, and
thus expose him to be the victim of the artful,
the importunate, and the cunning, where proper
time is not allowed to the party and he acts
improvidently, or if he is importunately
pressed, if those in whom he places confidence
make use of strong persuasions, if he is not
fully aware of the consequences, but is suddenly
drawn in to act, if he is not permitted to consult
disinterested friends or counsel before he is
called on to act in circumstances of sudden
emergency or unexpected right or acquisition in
these and many similar cases, if there has been
great inequality in the bargain, courts of equity
will assist the party on the ground of fraud,
imposition, or unconscionable advantage.
27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, p. 549, sec 24.
If the court concluded based on all the evidence and the
demeanor of the witnesses that defendants knew of or suspicioned
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plaintiff's mistake, then was not rescission properly granted
irrespective of any possible lack of due care.

Williston on

C (3rd Ed) puts it this way (Section 1557, page 243):
"Knowledge by one party to a bargain that the
other is under a mistake as to such a matter as
would make the transaction voidable if the
mistake were mutual, if accompanied by any
circumstances deemed inequitable. . . will have
the same effect as mutual mistake in justifying
rescission."
We might also want to consider the language of Cardozo on
this issue of neglect or mistake.
"True, indeed, it is that accident and mistake
will often be inadequate to supply a basis for
the granting or withholding of equitable remedies
where the consequences to be corrected might have
been avoided if the victim of the misfortune had
ordered his affairs with reasonable diligence.
United States v. Ames, 99 U.S. 35, 47, 25 L.Ed.
295; Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 23 L.Ed. 798;
Noyes v. Clark, 7 Paige, N.Y., 179 (32 Am.Dec. 620).
The restriction, however, is not obdurate, for
always the gravity of the fault must be compared
with the gravity of the hardship. Noyes v.
Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175 (26 N.E. 316, 21 Am. St.
Rep. 657); Lawrence v. American National Bank,
54 N.Y. 432; Ball v. Shepard, 202 N.Y. 247, 253,
95 N.E. 719. Let the harship be strong enough,
and equity will find a way, though many a formula
of inaction may seen to bar the path. Griswold
v. Hazard, 141 U.S. 260, 284, 11 S.Ct. 972, 999,
35 L.Ed. 678." Cardozo, C. J., dissenting in Graf
v. Hope Building Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884,
888, 70 A.L.R. 984.
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POINT III
RESCISSION BASED ON MUTUAL MISTAKE AS TO
ONE'S INTEREST IN LAND
Was the non-existence of a "joint tenancy" a mistake of
fact or a mistake of law?

Or perhaps both exist.

Assuming that

it is a mistake of law only, then defendant might

argue that

equity does not relieve against mistakes of law.

But this rule

has been frankly or actually modified in a good many cases when
dealing with mistake as to one's interest in land.
which grant relief may be classified as follows:

Those cases
(1) those that

frankly grant relief in cases of mistake of law; (2) those which
grant relief because there is also present undue influence, fraud,
or other ground of equitable cognizance; (3) those cases which
call the mistake a mistake of fact, or say that it is analogous
to a mistake of fact.
In an interesting case, Greer v. Higgins, Mississippi, 338
Southern Reporter, 2d 1233, we are confronted with a widow and
second wife of a decedent, together with her children, who brought
an action against the decedent's first wife and her children,
seeking to have a deed to defendants cancelled on the ground that
it had been executed under the misapprehension that the decedent
had died intestate.

The supreme Court of Mississippi held that

the doctrine of mutual mistake of fact was applicable and that the
deed therefore should be set aside.
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The court reasoned as follows;
In 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 144, at 894, it is said:
"A mutual mistake (of facts) is one common to both
parties to a contract, each laboring under the same
misconception; more precisely, it is one common to
both or all parties, wherein each labors under the
same misconception respecting a material fact, the
terms of the agreement, or the provisions of the
written instrument designed to embody such agreement.
The mistake may apply to the nature of the contract,
the identity of the person with whom it is made, or
the identity or existence of the subject matter; but
in order to -relieve a party from liability on the
contract, the mistake must relate to a material fact,
past or present. Misrepresentation or fraud is not
essential to proof of a mutual mistake."
There can be no doubt that when the parties executed
the deeds to each other in September 1970 they were
all laboring under the mistaken belief that Mr. Greer
had departed this life intestate. There can be no
doubt that the mistake was mutual and there can be no
doubt that the mistake was material. The deeds would
not have been executed but for the mistaken belief as
to the non-existence of the will.

>

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the facts of
this case present a clear case for the application of
the doctrine of mutual mistake of fact and that,
accordingly, the deed executed by the appellants and
their mother to the appellees should be cancelled and
set aside. Greer v. Higgins, 338 S.2d 1233, 1236.
13 Williston on Contracts, 3d ed, Section 1589, makes it clear
that ". . .if parties contract under a mutual mistake and
misapprehension as to their relative and respective rights, the
result is, that the agreement is liable to be set aside as having
proceeded upon a common mistake."
then states:

p 568.

(Emphasis added).

It

"Mistake as to title to land is relieved against."

p 569.
(
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One reason that rescission is appropriate is because this
was not a simple mistake as to the ownership of a one-third
interest in the land, but had to do with the existence of a
special relationship between the co-owners.

If it had been simply

a matter of deficiency in acreage, then an abatement (an adjustment
of the purchase price) might have been the remedy which would best
do justice.

However, in this case it would have required the court

to create a common ownership in the old family home between Lehmers
and the children of the plaintiff who felt their father had been
taken advantage of.

That type of hostile marriage was never

contemplated by either plaintiff or the defendant.

The "joint

tenancy" mistake itself was so important that it determined the
conduct of the mistaken parties.
Another reason that the mutual mistake justifies rescission
is because defendants, Lehmers, stipulated and acknowledged that
the severance of the joint tenancy was a condition precedent to
Webster receiving the purchase price of ?5000.00.
A.

(Mary Lehmer) I told him that he would have
to do that for himself a few years earlier
when we discussed when I had no intention of
buying his property.

Q.

Why would he have to do it, Mrs. Lehmer?

A.

I wouldn't have given him the money unless I
had him sign that thing and produce a death
certificate before I gave him the $5,000.
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Q.

So you would not have given him the $5,000
as payment for the purchase of the house as
contained in the October 7th, 1980, agreement
unless he had severed the joint tenancy on
the property, is that correct?

MR. CAMPBELL: I stipulate to that, Your Honor.
She's already answered the question. That
repetitious.
MR. SMEDLEY:
witness.

I'm asking for an answer from the

THE COURT: Well, overruled.
Q.

(By Mr. Smedley)

Would you answer the question.

A.

I would have had that done or I would not have
given him the money. That's why I did it on
December 21st to get things in readiness.
(T. 264).

This is a court of equity and thus we are to look to the
substance rather than the form.

It seems clear that the substance

of what was intended before Lehmers would pay, was to effect the
passing of Alice Webster's interest to Floyd Webster.
Mr. Campbell stipulated that "unless he (Floyd Webster) had
severed the joint tenancy" the Lehmers "would not have given him
the $5,000 as payment."

Mary Lehmer confirmed this when she stated,

"I would have had that done or I would not have given him the
money."
Floyd Webster did not have the ability to perform the substance
of what was intended.

Going through the form of severing a non-

existing joint tenancy would not have produced the results
contemplated.

The only advantage would have been to mislead the
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county recorder or those examining the record title or potential
purchasers into believing that the deceased wife's interest had
passed to the plaintiff and the children had no claim.
There was not only mutual mistake, but also present ground of
equitable cognizance.

"The principle of mutuality of right should

apply, that is, the rights of the plaintiff and the defendants
should be reciprocal."

(Conclusion of Law #6).

POINT IV
THE FIDUCIARY OR CONFIDENTIAL OR DOMINANT-SERVIENT
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHEREBY PLAINTIFF
MANIFESTED DEPENDENCE AND TRUST IN DEFENDANTS AND
ENTERED INTO THE SUBJECT AGREEMENTS AS A RESULT THEREOF.
Floyd Webster at 61 with an eighth grade education had been
an underground miner for 30 years.

In the fall of 1980 he was

unemployed and without funds and had a drinking problem.
things defendants knew.

These

Floyd Webster did work for the Lehmers

without charge and met with them as friends.

He knew that Mary

Lehmer was very knowledgeable regarding the title problem with the
mining company and she had advised both him and his wife in her
capacity as an attorney.

Floyd Webster believed that they would

not act contrary to his interests, and he trusted them.

He believed

the house was on Bureau Land Management ground and he sold property
worth $240,000.00 to $400,000.00 for $5,000.00.

The Lehmers knew

the property was on mining company land.
If these things were shown by clear and convicing evidence,
then plaintiff established an additional cause for rescission.
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13 Williston on Contracts (3rd Edition) sec. 1625, p. 776, puts
it this way:
If a party in whom another reposes confidence
misuses that confidence to gain his own
advantage while the other has been made to feel
that the party in question will not act against
his welfare, the transaction is the result of
undue influence.
The confidence moving from one party places the
other party in a position of dominance and
influence analogous to a confidential or fiduciary
relationship. It is not the existence of this
relationship which is undue but its misuse.
There is a technical difference between a
fiduciary relationship and a confidential
relationship, but most courts ignore it because
in practical effect the result is much the same
in either case. . . .
Where the party alleging undue influence has made
a case for the existence of a putative fiduciary
or confidential relationship, any gain realized
by the dominant party will be presumed to have
been the result of abuse of the relationship and
prima facie voidable. It is then up to the
dominant party to rebut this presumption by
showing the servient party had full knowledge
of all the circumstances, independent advice or
an opportunity to obtain it, and that the
transaction was fair and not the result of undue
influence.
A vital part of this proof is that the party
claiming to be the victim of undue influence had
independent advice or an opportunity to obtain
such advice. Proper independent advice means
that the alleged victim had the benefit of a full
and private conference with someone who could give
competent advice and was disassociated from any
gain or loss by the transaction.
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"Additional circumstances involved in any
determination of undue influence include age,
mental condition, physical infirmities, and the
consideration exchanged for the benefit received.
These are all elements which will be considered
by the courts when making a determination as to
the existence of undue influence."
Section 1626, p. 800,
"The various circumstances of age, infirmity,
or weak-mindedness of the promisor, or inadequacy
of consideration will not usually be sufficient
for proof of undue influence - these are merely
elements of the proof.
"The party alleging undue influence can, however,
avoid this direct burden of proof by simply proving
that he was the servient member of a confidential
or fiduciary relationship. Courts hold that this
raises a rebuttable presumption of undue influence
requiring the dominant party to come forward with
proof of the fairness of the transaction.
"This doctrine has been held applicable to a wide
variety of confidential and fiduciary relationships,
it is in fact applicable to any situation where, in
fact, influence was acquired or confidence reposed,
whether the basis for the reposing of this confidence
is moral, social, domestic or merely personal."
The American Law Institute Restatement of Law, 2d, Contracts
2d, Section 208 reads:
If a contract or a term thereof is unconscionable
at the time the contract is made, a court may
refuse to enforce the contract. . . .
Two pertinent comments under this section appeared to be
applicable to this case.
c. Overall Imbalance. Inadequacy of
consideration does not of itself invalidate a
bargain, but gross disparity in the values
exchanged may be an important factor in a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

determination that a contract is unconscionable
and may be sufficient ground, without more,
for denying specific performances. See Sections
79,364. Such a disparity may also corroborate
indications of defects in the bargaining process,
or may affect the remedy to be granted when there
is a violation of a more specific rule.
Theoretically it is possible for a contract to
be oppressive taken as a whole, even though there
is no weakness in the bargaining process and no
single term which is in itself unconscionable.
Ordinarily, however, an unconscionable contract
involves other factors as well as overall
imbalance.
d. Weakness in the Bargaining Process. A
bargain is not unconscionable merely because
the parties to it are unequal in bargaining
position, nor even because the inequality
results in an allocation of risks to the weaker
party. But gross inequality of bargaining power,
together with terms unreasonably favorable to
the stronger party, may confirm indications that
the transaction involved elements of deception
or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party
had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or
did not in fact assent or appear to assent to
the unfair terms. Factors which may contribute
to a finding of unconscionability in the
bargaining process include the following:
belief by the stronger party that there is
reasonable probability that the weaker party
will fully perform the contract; knowledge of
the stronger party that the weaker party will
be unable to receive substantial benefits
from the contract; knowledge of the stronger
party that the weaker party is unable reasonably
to protect his interests by reason of physical
or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or
inability to understand the language of the
agreement, or similar factors.
08 is supported by Section 364.

Effect of Unfairness:

Specific performance or an injunction will be
refused if such relief would be unfair because
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(a)

the contract was induced by mistake or by
unfair practices;

(b)

the relief would cause unreasonable hardship
or loss to the party in breach or to third
persons, or

(c)

the exchange is grossly inadequate or the
terms of the contract are otherwise unfair.

In citing Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, (a voluntary conveyance
to a son), and Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, (a transfer
to a niece reared as a daughter), appellants cite cases where
"the testimony. . . and conduct completely negative the possibility
of a mistake" (16 Utah 2d 385) and where the transfers were not
inequitable and there were not present grounds of equitable
cognizance.

Appellants also omit such qualify language as,

The doctrine of confidential relationship rests
upon the principle of inequality between the
parties, and implies a position of superiority
occupied by one of the parties over the other.
Mere confidence in one person by another is not
sufficient alone to constitute such a relationship.
The confidence must be reposed by one under such
circumstances as to create a corresponding duty,
either legal or moral, upon the part of the other
to observe the confidence, and it must result in
a situation where as a matter of fact there is
superior influence on one side and dependence on the
other. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 383,

and
No general or hard and fast rule which shall govern
or control in all cases can be promulgated, but every
case must, to a very large extent, be determined
upon the facts and circumstances present in that
case. All that we can say, therefore, is that in this
case the findings and conclusions of the trial court
in refusing to set aside the deeds in question
upon the ground of undue influence and want of mental
capacity are not only clearly sustained by the
evidence, but in our judgment, the findings and
judgment are in accord with the greater weight of
the evidence. Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 231.
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An

Constructive Fraud,

No part of the jurisdiction of the

court is more useful than that which it exercises in watching
and controlling transactions between parties standing in a
relationship of confidence to each other.

A party in a

"semiconfidential" relationship who gains an advantage, Mby
superior knowledge and artful silence," whereby he drives an
exhorbitant and unconscionable bargain is guilty of constructive
fraud against which relief in equity will be granted.

Gierth v.

Fidelity Trust Company, 93 NJ Eq 163, 115 A 397, 18 ALR 976.
Constructive fraud, sometimes called fraud in law, or implied fraud
rests less upon furtive intent than actual fraud, it need not
involve dishonesty or the element of deceit.

Am Jur statess

A mistake relievable in equity is said to be
some unintentional act, omission or error,
arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition,
or misplaced confidence. Equity undoubtedly
has jurisdiction to grant relief against a
mistake amounting to constructive fraud.
Accordingly, equity may and should always
intervene to prevent unjust enrichment. . . by
virtue of a mistake. 27 Am Jur 2d p. 552,
Equity 28.
i

The evidence was clear and convincing as to an "overall
imbalance."

The sum total of the circumstances clearly

corroborated plaintiff's claim that rescission was a proper remedy
i

and a remedy which would best do justice.
The evidence was clear and convincing that there was a
unilateral mistake as regarding record fee ownership - plaintiff
i
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believing on October 7, 1980, that his property was claimed by
the Bureau of Land Management; defendant knowing that the fee
ownership was reflected in private ownership and thus subject
to any valid adverse possession claims of plaintiff and to any
applicable statute of limitations.
The evidence disclosed beyond a reasonable doubt that both
parties believed the property was held in joint tenancy, when,
in fact, it was held in tenants in common with an interest in the
plaintiffTs daughters.
Because of plaintiff's condition and his circumstances,
because he was called in off the street with no advance notice or
independent advice, because the proposal was that of the
defendants by previous "plan", and because the writing was
immediately drafted by defendant, Mary Lehmer, a skilled legal
advisor and friend and neighbor, and thereupon signed by plaintiff
without having had an opportunity to contemplate, seek independent
advice, and/or search out ownership, the court was persuaded by
clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff was not guilty of
negligence in not being aware of record fee ownership and that
his unawareness was not the result of inexcusable lack of due care
and that rescission was proper.
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POINT V
APPELLATE COURT TO GIVE CONSIDERABLE
DEFERENCE TO FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT
OF TRIAL COURT
Even in a proceedings in equity, "it is, . . well established
that because of the advantaged position of the trial court" the
appellate court will "give considerable deference to his findings
and judgment."

Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976).

CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic that in the realm of equity, no formula is
absolute and no rule is without exception.

Defendants ignore this

axiom and attempt to dissect and to establish absolutes from
isolated particulars.

Very simply, the court found that because

of the "sum of the circumstances" that the plaintiff was entitled
to relief.

The salient points were (1) plaintiff (under a unique

set of circumstances) was called in off the street on the spur of
the moment into the home of his neighbors and friends without
advance warning, (2) the gross disparity between the potential
fair market value at the time of the transaction to the plaintiff
and his daughters and the price paid, (3) both parties were acting
upon a mutual mistake of substantial proportions, and (4) the
existence of a unilateral mistake which was critical.

The

<

supporting evidence to these matters was not only clear and
convincing but almost unchallenged.
i
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Plaintiff's right to equitable relief rests upon the peculiar
facts and circumstances.
would best do justice?

The ultimate issue. . . Which remedy

The trial court appropriately determined

that rescission was a proper remedy, i.e. , returning the parties
to the positions they occupied before entering into the contract.
Dated this

^^jLday of April, 1984.

Respectfully submitted,

>f<^&?
JM1ES J . SMEDfEY
3 o \ j o r t h Main, S u i t e
Heber C i t y , Utah 840/32
A t t o r n e y f o r Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief
of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert C. Campbell,
Jr., and E. Barney Gesas of Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main
Street, Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, on this
day of April, 1984.

30 North Main, Suite 5
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